
















SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITYTowards a Better System for Immigration Control
Gordon M. Myers and Yorgos Y. Papageorgiou¤
Revised September 2000
Abstract. We study di¤erent methods of immigration control using
a simple model of a congested world. Our main comparison involves quota,
the predominant instrument of immigration control, and a proposed system of
immigration tolls and emigration subsidies. We show that the equilibrium of
the proposed system is Pareto superior to the quota system. This is consistent
with thetolls and subsidies creating a market for international migrants. When
countries are price–takers the market becomes perfect and the exploitation of
gains from trade complete. From a normative perspective, an open–borders
policy is preferred to both control methods but will meet political opposition
because it hurts the residents of the rich country.
1. Introduction and Commentary
International borders are under the increasing stress of migration. Dramatic popu-
lation growth in poor countries, higher mobility, international economic disparities
and stable political conditions in rich countries create large migration ‡ows directed
toward the promise of a better life in another land. After the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act in the sixties, over twenty million people came to the US, mostly from
Latin America and Asia (Kennedy [13, 1996]). After the second world war, and
excluding the mass ethnic resettlements forced between 1945 and 1950 by the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements, some fourteen millionpeople entered the EUcountries from
Eastern Europe alone (Fassmann and Münz [9, 1994]). Immigration has obviously
played a central role in the economies of the developed countries.
Currently, there is potential for much more economic migration.1 It is also clear
that migration has not closed the gap in real incomes, let alone in the quality of life,
across international borders. For example, Mexico and the US have the largest real
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1Although recently increasing rates of immigration in the EU countries can be attributed to the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a further immigration potential of …ve to twenty–…ve
million eastern Europeans over the next decade has been proposed by di¤erent sources (Fassmann
and Münz [9, 1994]). These calculations must be augmented to take into account the other main
sources of EU immigration, esp. North Africa, the Near East and the Far East.
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incomedi¤erence betweenany twocontiguous countries inthe worldto–day (Kennedy
[13, 1996]), while the real income di¤erence between Eastern Europe and the EU is
about tenfold(Wellisch and Wildasin [21, 1996]). At the same time therich economies
nowappear to be congested, andthere is a widely heldbeliefinthe receiving countries
that unskilled immigrants impose a social cost on them. Such negative perceptions
are reinforced because the cost of public sector programmes increase withpopulation,
because illegal immigration has become a signi…cant part of total immigration and
because the ethnic composition of immigrants has changed to create visible minority
groups with strong cultural cohesiveness in the receiving countries. Consequently, the
restrictionist side is gaining momentum even in countries with traditionally liberal
attitudes to immigration. For example, both the Canadian Alliance Party (formerly
the Reform Party) and the National Front in France have included more restrictive
immigration policies as an important plank of their political platform.
The control of legal immigration is still dominated by a single direct method, the
quota system, whereby countries place an upper limit on the number of immigrants
they will accept. As we explain later on, the quota system is unsatisfactory. Further-
more, in response to the increasing pressure along their borders, the rich countries
have applied several strong policies and some new ideas to guard against illegal im-
migration.2 However, illegal immigration continues to grow. Black markets, both
for tra¢cking and smuggling human beings, thrive in the western world.3 Untold
thousands of destitutes are prepared to pay up–front the equivalent of years’ work
in their countries of origin, and even to put their lives on the line, for the uncertain
2“Western Europe has reacted to the new wave of immigration [after the collapse of communism
in Eastern Europe] with a mixture of fear, rejection and massive administrative measures, includ-
ing the deployment of specialized police and military along the borders, at ports and airports.”
(Fassman and Münz [9, 1994, p. 534].) Measures against illegal immigration have also increased in
the US after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act which provided for sanctions against
employers hiring illegals, conditional amnesty for those already living in the US, and stronger direct
enforcement along the southern border. (Enforcement includes walls build in the vicinity of major
American cities. Extending them along the entire border has been proposed by Pat Buchanan dur-
ing the 1996 Republican presidential nomination campaign.) Perhaps the most controversial type
of legislation along these lines is California Proposition 187, which aimed to discourage illegal entry
and to encourage the return of illegal residents by denying them explicitly the use of redistributive
public services such as public health and education. Improving conditions in Haiti or supporting the
peso currency represent US policies aimed to curb illegal immigration through international transfers
that improve conditions at the origin—rather than through wall–building at destination. Finally,
NAFTA can be interpreted as an international migration policy because it is expected to slow down
‡ows in the long–run by reducing wage di¤erentials among the countries involved (Freeman [10,
1992]).
3Tra¢cking refers to people engaged by black–market agents into some kind of indentured servi-
tude upon passage. Smuggling refers to people who pay a fee to black–market agents for passage.Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 3
promise of an illegal entry to what they perceive as a better world.4
Our objective is to sketch the rudiments of a new, potentially superior, immi-
gration control system for legal economic immigration. The basis of our proposal
is provided by the use of immigration tolls and emigration subsidies, which can be
designed to allow for exploitation of gains from trade. In regard to immigration tolls,
most countries have application fees and landing fees for immigrants, which are still
typically small but of growing importance. Canada, for example, has introduced a
thousand–dollar immigration fee in its 1995–96 federal budget. It also uses for some
time nowanentrepreneurial immigrationrule whereby anindividual receives the right
of residency in exchange for a certain minimum capital investment. More generally,
the idea that immigrants must pay an entrance price for their right of citizenship ap-
pears to be gaining ground. Becker [1, 1992], for example, has argued that the United
States and other rich countries should move from a system of immigration quota to
a system where citizenship is conferred to those willing to pay an immigration toll.
The very idea of a rich country selling the right of entry to poor immigrants may
seem repulsive at …rst glance. And since our proposal includes immigration tolls, one
could reject it right away as a bad one. We show, however, that the proposed system
of immigration tolls and emigration subsidies (henceforth “toll/subsidy system”) can
provide real bene…t to all parties involved—including immigrants and those who re-
main in the poor country. At the same time, it can provide a partial answer to the
black–market problem.5
We start with the model description of an open–borders policy (section two) on
which we impose in succession immigration quota (section three) and immigration
tolls without emigration subsidies (section four). Comparing the e¢ciency and equity
characteristicsofthosetypes, as well astheir structural advantagesanddisadvantages,
naturally leads to our proposal for a new immigration control system (sections …ve
and beyond).
4According to the United Nation’s World Development report for 1999/2000, the 1998 per capita
GNP in China and India was US$750 and US$430 respectively. These represent 2.6% and 1.5% of
the American per capita GNP. The smuggling fee for recent illegal Chinese immigrants to the North
American West Coast was up to US$40,000 (“Canada Deports 90 More Chinese ‘Boat People’ ”
Canadian Press News Service, 2000). In other words, some people in China were willing to pay a
50–year GNP equivalent for an illegal passage to North America.
5Early contributions to the idea of immigration tolls were Chiswick [6, 1982] and Simon [19,
1989, chapter 16]. (See Simon for further references.) To the best of our knowledge, the equilibrium
incentive for emigration subsidies by the sending country has gone unnoticed in the literature.
This may stem from the tendency to simplify theoretical models on international migration by
disregarding the public sector of the sending country (see, for example, models of national self–
interest in international trade). Or, it may stem from the fact that emigration subsidies do not make
sense under a quota system of immigration control. But the idea should be familiar to researchers in
regional science and local public economics, as emigration subsidies simply represent a very targeted
type of interregional transfer (see Myers [16, 1990] and Krelove [14, 1992].Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 4
In order to develop our arguments with as much clarity as possible, we overlay
alternative immigration control systems on a very simple model. We assume that
a single consumption good is produced competitively in each of two countries from
resident labour and a locationally …xed resource under identical technologies which
exhibit diminishing marginal and average products of labour. There is no physical
cost of movement between the two countries, but immigration can be restricted by
national governments. Individuals move when migration increases utility and it is
not prohibited. National governments control the …xed resource, distribute rents
to residents with head subsidies, impose immigration restrictions and are concerned
only with the well–being of their original residents. Under national self–su¢ciency,
after–subsidy consumption in each country is given by the average product of labour.
Since our proposal is about policy–making, one could become suspicious of strong
results based on such a simple model. For this reason we discuss at the end ways
in which our framework could be extended along a number of directions.6 Even
though such extensions could qualify some of our strong results here, we believe
that our proposal will remain clearly superior to the quota system in more general
contexts. Furthermore, even though our model is simple, it retains all elements
we deem essential in any policy–oriented study of immigration control. Namely, it
allows for (1) congestion; (2) a …xed national resource; (3) a complete speci…cation
of all endowments, preferences, and instruments; and (4) the determination of an
equilibrium.7
(1) Through diminishing average products, we create a starkly congested world con-
sistent with the currently observed, widespread tendency of raising barriers against
economic immigration. Potential bene…ts from freer migration exist through the pos-
sibility of labour ‡ows from low– to high–marginal–product countries.
(2) The concept of a country itself, through its geography and history, implies im-
portant productive national resources. On the one hand, geography implies …xed
factors such as land which are mostly in private hands. History, on the other hand,
implies publicly controlled productive factors such as transportation infrastructure,
a body of law, a set of traditions, and the system of governance itself. When study-
ing immigration control, there is a signi…cant distinction to be made between the
6In appendix D, for example, we prove that the nature of our results is immune to extensions
involving heterogeneous workers, a class of immobile landowners, or mobile landowning workers. The
intuition will be made clear later on, where we show that tolls and subsidies combined can eliminate
the usual con‡icting interests among di¤erent domestic residents which arise from immigration.
7To our knowledge, no paper in the existing literature about international migration control
accomodates all four. References in the international migration literature include Usher [20, 1977],
Chiswick [6, 1982], the special issue of the Journal of International Economics [Vol. 14, No. 3/4,
1983], Simon [19, 1989], Borjas [2, 1990], Greenwood [11, 1994], and Wellisch and Wildasin [21,
1996], to name only a few.Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 5
utility of citizenship and a citizen’s earned income. For example, while the utility
of an American worker depends on earned income, it also depends on all the rights,
privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship. A non–exhaustive list of citizenship
bene…ts would include consumption of personal and national security, a livable en-
vironment, an accountable legislature and judiciary, as well as publicly subsidised
access to transportation, education, and health care. The current ‡ows of these pro-
ductive factors/consumptions do not arise primarily out of current expenditure, but
rather as ‡ows from what might best be thought of as a stock of national resources
accumulated over the life of a country. We use a head subsidy, …nanced out of a pub-
licly controlled productive resource, as our highly simpli…ed proxy for the distinction
between a citizen’s earned income and the value of citizenship.8
(3) Assuming a complete set of lump–sum taxes as is often done to avoid distri-
butional issues is inappropriate for some types of immigration control, including a
quota system. We therefore impose that governments use appropriately restricted tax
instruments. Furthermore, in the presence of international migration, national en-
dowments of factors (e.g. labour and capital endowments) can change.9 We therefore
detail individual endowments.
(4) Because the underlying model is simple enough, we are able to characterise out-
comes in which all governments and individuals are doing as well as they can—given
feasibility and the behaviour of others. Modelling both governments is essential for us
because both immigration tolls and emigration subsidies are necessary for our results.
With an homogeneous population and without immigration control, our model
predicts an e¢cient migration equilibrium characterised by equal utility across coun-
tries (section two). The open–borders policy here implies that immigration reduces
the equilibrium utility level in the rich country. The very prospect of such an adverse
congestion e¤ect must generate a strong incentive for immigration control. With
quota alone as a control instrument the receiving country incurs the congestion cost
without any direct bene…t from immigration. Unsurprisingly, then, we …nd a com-
plete prohibition of movement under a pure quota system (section three), so that
the two countries are left at the ine¢cient initial allocation. This can be interpreted
as re‡ecting the truth that legal economic immigrants to–day constitute a rather
insigni…cant portion of the corresponding total volume.10
8As noted above, we model the case of privately held …xed factors (land) in appendix D. This
does not alter the central message of our paper. For a discussion of the problems associated with
disregarding immobile nationalfactors in models of internationalmigration (e.g. the buy–out results)
see Kuhn and Wooton ([15, 1987]).
9See Helpman and Krugman [12, 1985, p.204].
10Total immigration can be partitioned amongeconomic, political refugee, and family reuni…cation
categories. The share of political refugee cases and, especially, of family reuni…cation has grownTowards a Better System for Immigration Control 6
In our model, a rich and congested country will allow immigration only if it can
share at least some of the gains that emigration bestows upon immigrants and the
poor country. Since immigration tolls provide a natural mechanism for exploiting
those gains, they can represent an important and provocative policy innovation. We
incorporate tolls in the context of a simple game to undertake a more formal eval-
uation of the recent proposals along these lines (section four). In this game the
poor country does not make emigration subsidies so, other than distributing its pub-
lic resource rents to residents, it is passive. We restrict governments to treat their
homogeneous original residents equally andhave them maximise the utility ofa repre-
sentative original resident (e.g. median voter). We do not allow governments to force
migration—if agents move they do so in their own interest. In the …rst stage gov-
ernments simultaneously choose their subsidy and toll instruments knowing perfectly
well the consequences of their choices on migration. The second stage is a general
equilibrium model where individuals move if it is bene…cial. We obtain two main
results from this game. Firstly, that the switch in policy from quota to tolls may not
induce migration—hence it may not promote e¢ciency. Secondly, we …nd that when-
ever the rich country allows some Pareto–improving migration, it is never enough
from an e¢ciency perspective. The reason underlying this ine¢ciency is that the rich
country uses its toll to manipulate the international terms of trade for migrants.
The results in sections three and four hinge upon the passive nature of the poor
country. But is such behaviour in the interest of a poor country? If our assumption
that rich countries are congested is reasonable, it seems doubly so for poor countries;
and if poor countries are seriously congested, they will have a strong incentive to
act to reduce congestion through emigration. More emigration would be bene…cial,
both for the migrants who become citizens of the rich country and for those who
remain at home but who gain from the reduced congestion (e.g. better labour mar-
ket conditions). Based on these observations, we allow the government of the poor
country to o¤er an emigration subsidy to those who wish to emigrate if it improves
the living standard in that country (section …ve). Modifying our model toward this
direction leads to strong results. Firstly, changing from a pure quota system to a
toll/subsidy system promotes e¢ciency because the equilibrium outcome necessarily
involves migration from the poor to the rich country. Secondly, although the equi-
librium remains ine¢cient as both countries want to manipulate the terms of trade,
this change represents a strict Pareto improvement because it makes all citizens of
both countries better o¤.
In section six we compare the e¢cient competitive equilibrium allocation of a
signi…cantly in recent years at the expense of economic migrants. In the United States, for example,
family reuni…cation has represented over ninety per cent of the total immigration volume in some
years. Writing in 1988, Chiswick [7] reports 22,000 economic migrants out of 600,000.Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 7
market where price–taking countries buy and sell migrants to maximise national
income, with the equilibrium allocation of the non–cooperative game of section …ve.
We prove equivalence if the countries in the toll/subsidy game take the terms of
trade for migrants as given. We show that the immigration toll, in the absense of
an incentive to manipulate the terms of trade, is equal to the full unearned bene…ts
of citizenship and that the emigration subsidy is equal to the unearned bene…ts of
citizenshipinthepoor country. That is, thepoorcountry pays part of the immigration
toll faced by its emigrants. So, in the end, all a legal immigrant gains is a better job.
When there is no incentive to manipulate the terms of trade, such equivalence
has a set of implications. On the one hand, it makes it clear that the problem
with the quota system is that it involves a self–imposed price ceiling of zero on the
market for citizenship, with the obvious implications for the amount of equilibrium
trade. It also makes it clear that the reason why moving from a quota system to a
toll/subsidy system leads to Pareto improvements is that a market is created, and
if market trade is voluntary it must be mutually bene…cial. On the other hand, the
equivalence implies that a proponent of the toll/subsidy system implicitly supports a
bizarre competitive market.11 Finally, by the generality of the …rst welfare theorem
with respect to numbers of goods and market participants, the equivalence result
provides intuition as to why we can extend our results to heterogeneous population
types.12
In a sense the heart of our paper is section seven, where we discuss the policy
implications of our model from the perspective of international e¢ciency and dis-
tributive justice. We begin by showing that in our simple model there is a strong
normative ranking of immigration control systems. The toll/subsidy system norma-
tively dominates the quota system and is itself dominated by open borders. After
all, open borders represent a true free–trade regime. But even more importantly,
unlike free trade in goods, the removal of immigration control replaces accidents of
birth with a freedom of choice which promotes a fundamental tenant of social jus-
tice. Namely, it promotes horizontal equity in a strong and robust way.13 But an
open–borders policy in our simple model also makes the citizens of the rich country
worse–o¤. Clearly, this is consistent with an almost total lack of political support for
open borders in the rich countries of our congested world.
11This is a market for human beings with all the obvious restrictions on personal freedom.
12For example, when terms of trade cannot be manipulated, we show that all a legal immigrant
gains under a toll/subsidy system with or without heterogeneous labour, immobile landowners, or
worker/landowners, is a better job.
13This is stronger than factor–price equalisation. In the process of ranking immigration con-
trol systems we point out that nationalism, as a basis for making ethical judgements, violates
anonymity—a fundamental axiom of social choice. For this reason nationalism falls into the same
category as sexism and racism.Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 8
In the rest of section seven and in section eight we attempt to leave our simple
model behind and generate realistic normative arguments which could support the
use of a quota system. We examine arguments that we have been collecting over
the years and largely reject them. We close by considering positive arguments which
could support the use of a quota system and do provide one rent–seeking example.
2. Open Borders
We begin with the description of our basic model. There is a mobile population
and an immobile resource, both of …xed total size, partitioned between two countries
which form a closed system. Initially, country one is rich and country two is poor.
The population partition is denoted by (N1;N2) with N1+N2 = N and Ni ¸ 0. The
…xed resource partition is denoted by (T1;T2). We assume that the …xed resource
of each country is controlled by its government. The initial population partition is
denoted by (No
1;No
2), where a superscript ‘o’ speci…es variables at the initial stage of
the system. We assume that the initial population partition is ine¢cient and that
No
i > 0.
Individuals are identical with respect to bothability and tastes. They inelastically
supply one unit of labour in the country where they live, and they derive utility from
the consumption of a single good which we make the numéraire. We further assume
that utility is linear in the good. Labour and resource available in each country
are combined by competitive …rms to produce the good under an identical, linear
homogeneous and concave technology X[Ni;Ti] for i = 1;2. Consequently, labour
and resource are paid their marginal product denoted yi and ri respectively, while
…rms earn zero pro…ts:
Xi = Niyi + Ri (1)
where Ri ´ Tiri.
Since an open–borders policy implies no direct or indirect control on either emi-
gration or immigration, the government of each country has only one instrument—a
residence–baseduniformheadsubsidy si.14 Thus thebudget constraint ofgovernment
i is given by
Nisi = Ri; (2)
while consumption is simply after–subsidy income
xi = yi +si: (3)
14Tax discrimination based on original residence is inadmissible both under open borders or aquota
system as it amounts to allowing an immigration toll. Thus assuming there is no tax discrimination
in this model (the population is homogeneous) does not represent a simplifying assumption. Rather,
it is a requirement for maintaining consistency with “real world” immigration regimes. Later on,
when we discuss extensions to populations with heterogeneous characteristics, we shall consider the
possibility of discrimination on the basis of original residence.Towards a Better System for Immigration Control 9
Combining (2) and (3) to eliminate the head subsidy and invoking (1), we obtain
xi = ¹ xi; (4)
where ¹ xi denotes the average product of labour in i:15 In the migration equilibrium,
individuals locate to equalise average products (utility) which, given identical tech-
nologies, equalises marginal products yielding the equal–utility, e¢cient migration
equilibrium.16
3. Immigration Quota
Theanalysisof aquotasystemis equally simpleinthis model. Once governmentshave
the ability to prevent immigration by imposing quota they will do so. In particular,
under a pure quota system, governments may not discriminate against individuals on
the basis of their original residence. Therefore since the only tax instrument available
is a residence–based head subsidy si as in section two, (4) holds under a pure quota
system; and since ¹ x1 decreases with N1, immigration is damaging to the rich country
one. Consequently country one prohibits immigration by imposing a zero quota level,







Weconsiderthe followingsimplegamebetweenanactive richcountry (one) and apas-
sive poor country (two). First, national governments choose their policy instruments
simultaneously. Then, given these policies, there is a general equilibrium model where
individuals choose a residence, production takes place, policies are implemented and
consumption occurs. We assume governments know perfectly well the consequences
of their choices on migration behaviour. Since yo
1 > yo





1, where a superscript ‘*’ denotes variables at an e¢cient allocation.
For simplicity we assume from now on that N¤
1 < N.
We assume that the government of the rich country sells citizenship to immi-
grants. The bene…ts of citizenship are the earned bene…ts worth y1 and the unearned
bene…ts worth s1: The immigration toll is t21: Thus the budget constraint of the rich
government is given by
N1s1 = R1 + Mt21 (5)
15Notice that a government’s objective to maximise utility is not equivalent to maximising national
income in our context. Such equivalence requires a complete set of lump–sum taxes, which is
inconsistent with both an open–borders or a quota regime.
16This result extends to di¤ering technologies. We shall return to this issue in section eight, where
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whereM ´ N1¡No
1 = No
2¡N2 denotes the net numberof migrants. Theconsumption
of an original resident in that country is after–subsidy income
x1 = y1 +s1 (6)
as before, while the consumption of an immigrant is
x21 = y1 +s1 ¡ t21: (7)
The description of country two follows exactly section two. Consequently
x2 = y2+ s2: (8)
Migration will occur only if the immigration toll set by government one is such
that xo
21 > xo
2. Using (7) and (8), this implies
yo
1 ¡ yo
2 > t21¡ s1 +s2: (9)
If (9) does not hold, an immigration tolls policy in our model generates the same
ine¢cient equilibrium as an immigration quota policy does. If it holds, migration
into country one will proceed. The migration process will be stable as x21 ¡ x2 is
decreasing in N1 by the concavity of the production function. Thus migration will
continue until either utility is equalised for all original residents of the poor country,
ye
1 + s1 ¡ t21 = ye
2 + s2; (10)
or until the poor country is depopulated, in which case xe
21jN1=N > xe
2jN2=0, where a
superscript ‘e’ denotes variables at equilibrium. The latter cannot happen because,
with N1 = N > N¤
1; xe
21jN1=N > xe
2jN2=0 would require t21 < 0. In this case the
rich country is hurt by the immigration through increased congestion and through
payments to immigrants. Then the solution will involve either no migration or (10).
The government of country one maximises the utility of its original residents by
choosing (s1;t21), treating s2 as given and subject to its budget constraint, while
taking fully into account the internal migration equilibrium. In appendix A we show










i ´ @yi=@Ni. Notice that te
21 > se
1 because Me > 0 and y0
i < 0 by concavity.
Therefore the equilibrium toll is greater than the unearned bene…ts of citizenship
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Replacing (11) and (12) in (10) determines Ne
1.17






2 > 0because Me > 0, oneconcludes that immigrationtolls
do not lead to a full exploitation of gains from trade. In fact, we …nd that replacing
quota with tolls need not promote e¢ciency since no migration will occur unless yo
1 >
¹ xo





2; so that (9) is violated
when yo
1 < ¹ xo
2: Thus Me = 0 will be an equilibrium outcome if yo
1 < ¹ xo
2. This happens
because the value of an immigrant to country one is y1, but a resident of country two
requires at least ¹ x2 in order to emigrate. In consequence, there are two reasons for
ine¢ciency. First, the unearned bene…ts of citizenship in the poor country distort
migration incentives. Second, in order to attract an additional migrant, country one
must lower the entrance toll charged to all inframarginal immigrants. Hence the rich
country has an incentive to manipulate the terms of trade for migrants, using its
entrance toll in the same way a monopolist sells less than the e¢cient level of a good
to increase its price.
5. Immigration Tolls and Emigration Subsidies
The results in section four hinge upon the passive nature of the poor country—it was
a game of solitaire. In this section we add the possibility of an emigration subsidy
for that country, thus making both countries active. Although no country can send
people into exile, a country now may encourage some people to emigrate by making
it in their self–interest. Everything else remains as in section four.
For country one both the national budget constraint and the consumption of an
original resident are still givenby (5) and(6) respectively. However, since an emigrant
now receives an emigration subsidy s21, (7) is modi…ed as
x21 = y1+ s1¡ t21+ s21: (13)
The budget constraint of the poor government is given by
N2s2 + Ms21 = R2 (14)






2 > t21 ¡ s1 + s2 ¡ s21 (15)
as required for migration. If (15) is satis…ed, and since the migration process is still
stable, migration will continue until
ye
1 + s1 ¡ t21 +s21 = ye
2 + s2 (16)
17Uniqueness problems could arise when the equal–utility constraint is nonlinear in N1. However,
substitution of (11) and (12) in (10) in the case of a quadratic production function yields an ex-
pression which is linear in N1 and an equilibrium solution which is unique for all variables. Such
numerical examples are available upon request.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 12
or until the poor country is depopulated, in which case xe
21jN1=N > xe
2jN2=0. Given
that (15) holds we proceed by solving for the equilibrium conditional on the existence
of an internal solution, from now on conditional equilibrium. Later on we shall verify
that a country cannot …nd it unilaterally pro…table to deviate from this solution and
therefore prove that the conditional equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
The optimisation problem for country one remains as before, and in appendix B
we show that it leads once again to (11). For country two, the government maximises
the utility of its residents by choosing (s2;s21), treating (t21;s1) as given and subject
to its budget constraint, while taking fully into account the second–stage internal











2. Therefore the equilibrium exit subsidy is smaller than the
unearned bene…ts of citizenship in the poor country. Replacing (11) and (17) in (16)
we …nd that ye
1¡ye
2 = ¡Me (ye0
1 +ye0
2 ) > 0, or Ne
1 < N¤
1. This happens because, now,
the two countries use their immigration tolls and emigration subsidies for manipu-
lating the terms of trade to their favour. Nevertheless, even though the conditional
equilibrium is not e¢cient, switching from quota to the toll/subsidy system has two
bene…cial implications. First, it promotes e¢ciency in the sense of increasing the
economy’s output. Second, and this is our main result here, it leads to a strict Pareto
improvement.
(1) E¢ciency is promoted because N¤
1 > Ne
1 > No
1 given that (15) holds. From
(11) and (17) we …nd that as M ! 0, t21 ! s1 and s2 ! s21, so that (15) is
necessarily satis…ed. The logic is that the incentive to manipulate the terms of trade
in migrants disappears as that trade disappears, and in economies where yo
1 < ¹ xo
2
migration is induced and gains from trade exploited by s21 > 0. As M ! 0, using
(14), s2 ! s21 ! Ro
2=No
2 > 0.
(2) In order to establish that switching from quota to tolls and subsidies represents
a strict Pareto improvement, we begin by solving for the national income No
1x1 that
goes to the original residents of the richcountry. Subtracting Mese
1 from both sides of
(5), using (6) to eliminate se
1 from the LHS, adding andsubtractingNe
1ye
1 on the RHS,







the national income of original residents is output minus (domestic) payments to
(originally) foreign factors. Given Me > 0, hence te
21 > se






1. Since the LHS of the inequality is the whole area under
the marginal product function between No
1 and Ne
1 while the RHS is just part of this
area under ye
1, we conclude that switching from quota to tolls and subsidies is indeed
bene…cial to theoriginal residentsof therichcountry. Followinga similar approachfor
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the national income is output plus (foreign) payments to (originally) domestic factors.






21). Given Me > 0, hence
se
2 ¡ se





2. The LHS is the
whole area under ye
2 between Ne
2 and No
2 while the RHS is just part of this area under
the marginal product function. Therefore switching from quota to tolls and subsidies
is also bene…cial to all original residents of the poor country (recall xe
2 = xe
21 by (16)).
We close this section by establishing that the conditional equilibrium allocation
is a Nash equilibrium allocation. We show that there are no pro…table unilateral
deviations to policy choices which lead to a corner solution in terms of migration.
The strict Pareto improvement implies that neither country would prefer to deviate
unilaterally from the conditional equilibrium and prohibit migration. The other cor-
ner solution, where the poor country is depopulated, also represents an unpro…table
unilateral deviation because we assume an empty country two implies no exit subsidy
since there are no people left to pay for it; and if there is no exit subsidy, country one
must set a negative immigration toll in order to achieve a population larger than N¤
1.
6. A Competitive–Like Market for Migrants
In this section we show that if the two countries take the economy’s after–tax–return
to migration as given then the Nash equilibrium of section …ve is equivalent to a
competitive market for migrants.
We …rst describe the competitive market. Imagine a world in which the two
countries can buy and sell migrants taking the price p as given. Country i chooses
the volume of net imports Mi in order to maximise national income ¦i, speci…ed as
the national output minus the payment for net imports of immigrants. By de…nition
¦i = Xi ¡ pMi: (18)





where a superscript ‘c’ denotes variables at the competitive equilibrium. It follows
that the equilibrium partition is the e¢cient partition, i.e. Nc
i = N¤
1. Since in the




i = 0: (20)




1 migrants at a price pc = y¤.18
18It is clear that the same implications hold when there are many countries and that this framework
can be extended to many types of migrants di¤ering by labour type with one market for each type.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 14
If we divide both sides of (18) by No
i , we observe that a government which max-
imises (18) and ensures equal consumption for each of its original residents also max-
imisesthe utility of its representativeoriginal resident. Usingthezero–pro…t condition
(1) to evaluate (18) divided by No
i at the competitive equilibrium, we obtain
xc








2, (21) speci…es the consumption of the representative original resident
for country i.
We next describe the equilibrium allocation of section …ve in the special case
where the two countries take the economy’s after–tax–return to migration as given.
In that case (16) becomes
yce
1 + s1 ¡ t21 + s21 = Y (a)
yce
2 + s2 = Y (b)
(22)
where the constant Y is the after–tax–return to migration and the superscript “ce”







Upon substitution of (23) in (22) we …nd that yce
1 = yce
2 , hence that Nce
1 = N¤
1.






1 on (5) and (6), as well as sce
2 = R¤
2=No








Comparing (21) with (24) weconclude that the competitive equilibrium allocation
is equivalent to the equilibrium allocation of the toll/subsidy system if countries are
price takers. The rich country charges an immigration toll equal to the unearned
bene…ts ofcitizenshiptce
21 = sce
1 which, by (5), is R¤
1=No
1. The poor country participates
by paying an emigration subsidy equal to the unearned bene…ts of citizenship in the
poor country sce
21 = sce
2 which by (14) is R¤
2=No
2. That is, the poor country pays part
of the immigration toll faced by its emigrants.19 So, in the end, although the rich
country sells the immigrant citizenship, all the immigrant gains is a better job worth
the e¢cient marginal product of labour y¤. Notice that both tolls and subsidies are
required for the market analogy. Also notice that, in the more realistic case where








2 by identical technologies
and N ¤
1 > N o
1 and N ¤
2 < N o
2Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 15
countries are not price takers, denying access to the rich country’s public sector does
not represent a su¢cient toll from the perspective of the rich country. Finally notice
that, with or without price taking, denying access to the rich country’s public sector
is not su¢cient if we move to a more realistic model where the unearned bene…ts of
citizenship are more than simply an amount of the single good, for example, if the
bene…ts were partially non-rival or non–excludable in nature.
7. Policy Issues
Weconsider policy prescriptioninthe context ofour model from the perspectiveof in-
ternational e¢ciency anddistribution. We haveshown that the proposed toll/subsidy
system is Pareto superior to a pure quota policy. But we also know that an open–
borders policy is both e¢cient and egalitarian, hence it has much to recommend it
over the alternative system. More precisely, given the policy instruments of section
…ve and the identical nature of individuals in our model, the international utility–
possibility frontier is characterised by the maximum feasible world output X¤
1 + X¤
2
and any distribution of that output between residents of the two countries.20 It has
slope ¡No
1=No
2 in fx1;x2 = x21g space. Because it is symmetric around the equal
consumption line (once relative population sizes are taken into account), using any
individualist welfare function which does not exhibit a preference for inequality and
does not give more social weight to individuals on the basis of their birthplace, one
would conclude that open borders are socially preferred to either immigration control
policy. The usual “normative” defense of restrictive immigration control policies is
nationalism, which is precisely expressing a social preference over individuals on the
basis of an ethically arbitrary characteristic such as birthplace.21
Eventhoughan open–borderspolicy is superior froma normative point ofview, its
implementation seems di¢cult from a positive political perspective because it is not
a Pareto improvement over immigration control.22 Since rich countries can do better
by controlling immigration, it is not puzzling why they impose controls on economic
20For example, to implement the extreme e¢cient allocation where the original residents of country
one receive nothing, set s1 = ¡y¤




2, t21 = y¤
1 + s1 ¡ X¤
1=M¤ and s21 =
(X¤
1 + X ¤
2 )=N o
2 ¡ X¤
1=M ¤. This policy yields the e¢cient allocation where the original residents of
country two consume (X¤
1 + X¤
2) =N o
2 irrespectively of …nal residence and all budgets are balanced.
21The anonymity axiom, which eliminates di¤erent social weightings based on ethically arbitrary
characteristics such as name, sex, race or birthplace, is basic in social choice. As an ethical criterion,
it seems there is little to choose among nationalism, sexism and racism. This result, however, does
not mean that an increase in nationalism could not be associated with better social outcomes. But
if this happens, it happens through expanding what is feasible—not because it is a good ethical
criterion. And as caveats, the same could be true of racism or sexism, any of which could just as
well reduce what is feasible.
22But maybe not impossible. There are examples where richer countries (Germany) have imple-
mented an open–borders policy with poorer countries (Portugal) in wider agreements (Treaty of
Rome).Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 16
immigrants.23 However, from an economic viewpoint, our results suggest that it is
puzzling why quota, rather than tolls, have been the predominant instrument of such
control. So, as one moves away from our highly simpli…ed model, it seems useful to
consider what elements of reality can explain the predominance of quota to–day.
Is there something which could lead to the normative dominance of quota? One
argument against moving to a system involving tolls is that only those already rich
in poor countries could a¤ord the net cost of entry. However, it seems reasonable
to expect that the individuals who most want to come are those who can gain the
most, and these are the poor rather than the rich who already are privileged. The
poor could borrow against future income streams, if not in private markets, from the
rich country’s government. The loan could then be paid back through higher income
taxes.
A second argument, whichwe might call the ‘Statue of Liberty’ argument, is based
on the notion that it is wrong for the government of a country to discriminate against
someone who has already been accepted as a citizen of that country. In this context,
a pure quota policy is preferable to a policy involving tolls because, unlike tolls,
quota do not discriminate among citizens of the same nation. This argument involves
putting more social weight on the well–being of individuals as they cross a national
border. However, changing your concern for the well–being of someone because he
or she has crossed an arbitrary geographical border has no ethical foundation. If
anything, from an ethical perspective, an argument against discrimination is not an
argument for quota—it is an argument for open borders.
A third one, the ‘bleak–world’ argument, maintains that tolls are bad since they
create an underclass subjected to economic discrimination in the rich country. How-
ever, the same underclass exists with quota or tolls, the di¤erence being that under
quota the poor are poorer and contained in the poor country.24
The idea of charging a price for admission runs contrary to the humanitarian
intent suggested by the very existence of nonzero quota in a congested world. Many
would maintain that acquiring citizenship should not be costly. But as Becker [1,
1992] notes, “...this objection is ignorant of history. The fact is that most immigrants
in the past paid dearly for the right to enter. They paid indirectly by enduring
the burdens of a long and arduous journey and directly by meeting the enormous
costs of transportation. (The fare for crossing the Atlantic from Europe during the
early 19th century equaled about a year’s earnings in the U.S.)” This objection is
questionable also on the grounds that, as our paper indicates, charging a price for
admission instead of imposing strict quota can lead to a socially preferred outcome.
23Recall that our paper is focused on economic immigrants—not political refugees or family re-
uni…cation.
24Another argument against tolls relates to their distributional consequences when the population
is heterogeneous. We will address, and largely reject, that argument in the next section.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 17
Finally there is an argument which is more di¢cult to dismiss. It seems possible
to us that a “good citizen” refers to something which is created and nurtured—not
born. In other words, welcoming an immigrant as a equal citizen may create a dif-
ferent quality of citizen, with di¤erent values and preferences than when, through
an entrance price, an immigrant clearly di¤ers from the natives. However, such an
argument seems to be largely beyond current economics because, even though indi-
viduals have values and preferences in economic models, they are typically exogenous.
And although this is likely something worth consideration, excluding someone very
poor (and thus already well–versed in exclusion) because of a concern for his or her
psychological well–being seems weak.25
8. Limitations and Extensions
Our model assumes costless migration of identical individuals between two countries
within a strongly congested world.
Adding di¤erent forms of congestion and/or migration costs will change both the
characteristicsof equilibrium and e¢ciency, but webelieve these wouldnotchangethe
qualitative characterof our results because wealready haveonetype ofcongestionand
one type of non–technological migration cost (immigration tolls). Besides abstracting
from the costs of migration, we have also abstracted from the costs of immigration
control. Even a cursory look at the immigration pressure on the Mexican/American
or on the East European/West European border, makes it clear that this is a strong
assumption worth exploring.26 But one could well argue that adding illegal immigra-
tion would simply lead to stronger normative arguments for tolls/subsidies, and to
even stronger arguments for open borders over quota (a price ceiling).
Since the publicly provided good in our model is purely rival (and a perfect sub-
stitute for the private good), one natural extension would be to a corresponding
imperfectly rival good. This would add some complexity, which we wished to avoid,
but we are con…dent that it does not change the central message of our paper. We
have already mentioned one important aspect it would add at the end of section six.
In addition, making the publicly–provided good non-rival would reduce congestion in
the model. With su¢cient economies of scale in consumption it could remove conges-
tion altogether, but since reality suggests a congested world for at least some labour
types, such an assumption would be going too far. Modelling public goods would
also make transparent the strong relationship that exists between the literature on
25Also note that this is not an argument for quota, based on the possible implication that tolls
create bad immigrant–citizens and, therefore, damage the well–being of indigenous residents of the
rich country. The reason being that this implication represents just another form of congestion, and
thus it is simply an argument for a higher toll.
26See Ethier [8, 1986], Chiswick [7, 1988], and Myers and Papageorgiou [17, 2000] on the control
of illegal immigration.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 18
clubs and a model of immigration with entrance tolls. The publicly provided good is
o¤ered by a club manager (national government) to those willing to pay an entrance
price (immigration toll). Such analogy would allow the application of well–developed
results in the clubs literature to problems of immigration, and it would lead to many
familiar notions from that literature as, for example, that a manager (national gov-
ernment) attempting to sell club membership (citizenship) has an incentive to be
technically e¢cient in providing a desirable product (good government). One way in
which the analogy does not …t is that, while in the clubs literature individuals are
initially footloose, individuals in an immigration model are initially landlocked. It
was this particular di¤erence, together withthe inability of a country to freely dispose
of its excess initial population, that led to an emigration subsidy instrument in our
model—a necessity which does not apply in the clubs literature.27
Results for extending our model toanheterogeneouspopulationin the caseof open
bordersexist inthe literature. Considerdi¤erentlabour typesa andb(e.g. skilledand
unskilled labour). First, the result that open borders lead to a full Pareto–e¢cient
allocation does not extend to the heterogeneous case (see Burbidge and Myers [5,
1994] and Bucovetsky [4, 1995]). The problem (according to Burbidge and Myers) is
that governments distort migration decisions with unequal residence–based taxation
in their attempt to play favourites (e.g. a right–wing government favouring skilled
workers versus a left–wing government favouring the poorer unskilled). This is sup-
ported by the result that if governments do not have the incentive to play favourites,
in other words, if they have the same objective function over utilities of the two types
(same type of median voter) then a Pareto–e¢cient allocation is a Nash equilibrium
even if there are externalities or congestion, and interregional transfers are required
for the Pareto–e¢cient allocation. This is an extension of the incentive–equivalence
result of Myers [16]. Bucovetsky provides a strong example of exactly what can go
wrong with open borders. There is one labour type, but the population is heteroge-
neous in that each person born in a region owns an equal share of the land in their
region of birth. Governments maximise the utility of only their indigenous residents
(play favourites in anatural way) and distort migration with unequal residence–based
taxation.28 So the conclusion is that, from an e¢ciency perspective, there may be
little to choose between a toll/subsidy system and open borders once population
27See Scotchmer [18, 1994] for an insightful discussion of this literature.
28While the notion of perfect incentive equivalence disappears with an heterogeneous population,
the idea that open borders partially tie together incentives does not. Many authors, including policy
makers, have argued that American support for the peso during its crisis is partially explained as
preventing increased illegal immigration. Under open borders what would happen? Would powerful,
developed countries allow tin–pot dictators to ravage their own people if the developed countries
knew that they would have to pay the immigration price? To some extent, migration still implies
that helping (hurting) your neighbour is helping (hurting) yourself.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 19
becomes heterogeneous. On the other hand, the idea that open borders promotes
horizontal equity fully extends to an heterogeneous population.
Something else which changes with heterogeneity in our model is that discrimina-
tion against immigrants, even though still illegal in a strict sense, becomes possible
under both open borders and the quota system. For example, you can put higher
tax rates (or lower expenditure rates) on personal characteristics that are positively
correlated with foreign place of birth. A primary point in Bucovetsky is that, given
his land–ownership assumption, the government can, and will, discriminate perfectly
against immigrants. Thus taxation or subsidisation of land and labour becomes as
good as a toll.29 But, of course, reality lacks such perfect indicators so that your
ability to discriminate indirectly is imperfect. As a result, perverse distortionary
consequences follow from the attempt.30 And we are left with still another argument
for replacing the quota system with the direct (and honest) discrimination device of
immigration tolls and emigration subsidies.
Congestion occurs whenimmigrants decrease the well–beingof those in the receiv-
ing country, in other words, when they become a …scal burden by consuming more
than what they produce with what they own. So, without the compensating factor
of discrimination (a toll), binding quota would be imposed by a country concerned
with the well–being of its own population. With some public ownership of land, oil
etc., or with some good government and not too much increasing returns, homogene-
ity of the population and budget balance yields congestion as in our model where
y + s > y because s > 0. Because we view congestion, in at least one population
type, as essential for consistency with the situation we observe in the world under
its quota system (why do we not we let them all in?), we built congestion in our
simple model. However, this model need not be congested for all population types
once the population is heterogeneous. To see this simply note that sa
i need not be
29Bucovetsky is about migration within a country (open borders) and as such it has a di¤erent
focus than our paper. But because it models both governments and because of the perfect tax
discrimination against immigrants, it is likely the most closely related paper to ours. However, it
has no congestion (everything is privately owned and there is no distinction between earned income
and the value of citizenship) and it does not discuss emigration subsidies.
30For example, it is undoubtedly the case that some indigenous residents of every developed
country in the world are endowed with nothing much but their labour. And these are likely the
most important indigenous types when it comes to considering the consequences of international
migration in a congested world, and the billion or so Chinese and Indians who would like to come
to the developed world if they were allowed to do so.
Myers and Papageorgiou [17, 2000] allows for illegal immigration with landowners and workers, and
provides another perverse policy example in the case of a government which can only discriminate
indirectly. A government wants to allow immigration of workers only if it can discriminate. It cannot
discriminate against legal immigrant workers but it can discriminate against illegal immigrants
because they are illegal. So the government sets immigration quota to zero and lets in illegal
immigrants by not enforcing it.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 20
positive, even with a large population–wide uniform bene…t from a good government,
once sa
i is understood to be the net interaction with the government, in other words,
to include taxation. Maybe type a is rich and pays a high income tax which is then
redistributed to the poor type b.
Let us now extend the model to heterogeneous labour types. For simplicity, as-
sume that migration is directed to country one for both types and that it is stable.
Also assume that governments care only about their indigenous populations, andthat
they choose type–dependent entrance tolls and exit subsidies (markets by type) in
order to maximise a non–decreasing function of the utilities corresponding to types












1 for i = a;b and i 6= j (b)
(25)
which extend (11) and (17), where ‘e’ has been dropped so that superscripts now





h. When there is no comple-
mentarity between labour types (i.e. y
ij
h = 0 for i 6= j) then (11) and (17) still apply,
one for each type. Under complementarity or substitutability in its manipulation of
terms of trade, when each government chooses a toll or subsidy on one type, it must
now also consider the e¤ects of migration on toll revenue or subsidy cost of the other
type. In appendix D we add a class of landowners in each country and show that
it leads to (25) as well. We also model mobile landowning workers to get (25) once
again. The extension and the intuition for the generality of these results are exactly
as discussed in section six. For price–taking countries an individual buys citizenship,
but because of the immigration toll and the emigration subsidy all the individual
gains is the better job. Notice that the standard distributional a¤ects of allowing
entry to unskilled workers (landowners/capitalists bene…t and indigenous unskilled
workers hurt) need not apply. Any government’s objective function which does not
decrease in the utilities would not give less to an indigenous resident. This happens
precisely because the set of tolls and subsidies available allows each government to
separate its product–maximising objective from its distributional objective.31
Since a type may not be congested, there are various possibilities to explore. First
consider the case of an equilibrium immigration subsidy (e.g. the case of land grants
in North America during the 19th century, or the case of a rich country paying the
migration cost of immigrants in the 1970s). With sa
1 < 0, for example, it becomes
31This is fundamentally about introducing tolls and subsidies, but it is also about having lump–
sum taxes to handle redistributional incentives. Undoubtedly, since the marginal cost of public funds
is greater than unity, extending results to remove lump–sum taxes could weaken the conclusion. But
whether it does or not is really an open issue. With the change in regimes from quota to tolls and
subsidies, countries have new sources of revenue but also new costs.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 21
possible in the model to have an equilibrium immigration subsidy. With sa
2 < 0 it also
becomes possible to have an emigration toll. These are interesting possibilities, and
notice that they raise standard issues from the brain–drain literature. For example,
the migration of “brains” from poor countries may hurt those left behind in the
absence of an emigration toll. But, in comparing quota with tolls and subsidies, also
notice that they play only a small role because the potential for these instruments
already exist under quota. For example, the brain–drain issue identi…ed above is
already an issue under our current quota system.
There are information problems in choosing immigrants as well. This is another
type of congestion and would involve a higher toll to make it bene…cial for the rich
country. Asymmetric information issues should also be explored.
Objecting to a toll system on economic migration out of concern for political
refugees and family reuni…cation may be legitimate. But recall that migration and
tolls make the rich country richer, so that if help for political refugees and family
reuni…cation are normal goods then the rich country will consume more.
An interesting explanation as to why we use quota may be the positive argument
that citizens who are recent immigrants themselves, and who identify with potential
immigrants from their home country, apply focused political pressure to assure pos-
itive quotas for their preferred group. Under quota, the only ones who bene…t from
migration in the rich country are the immigrants themselves. This would change
under tolls.32 But also notice that the right of entry under the quota system is a
big unpriced prize to the lucky recipient and, as such, it becomes similar to clas-
sic rent–seeking cases (e.g. a publicly–awarded monopoly license). By the standard
rent–seeking arguments, you not only lose due to low levels of economic immigration
under quota—you could also expect to lose much of the migration productivity gains
from any immigration that does occur. The productive value of the entry in equi-
librium is dissipated by completely wasteful expenditures in seeking the prize. You
hire immigration lawyers or lobbyists (who would otherwise spend their time doing
something productive) possibly to the full value of the prize.
Several of those extensions and others would undoubtedly qualify the strong re-
sults in our simple model. But it is equally clear that a normative justi…cation of the
quota system, and its zero implicit immigration toll, will be di¢cult in the face of
immigration tolls and emigration subsidies which support a market for migrants.
A. Appendix A: Proof of (11) and (12)
Through (10) for migration equilibrium, Ne
1 becomes an implicit function of the
instruments. Totally di¤erentiating this equation and using dNe
1 = ¡dNe
2 allows us
32We thank a referee for this argument.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 22


















The problem of country one is
max
fs1;t21g
L1 = y1 + s1 + ¸1(R1 ¡ N1s1 +(N1 ¡ N
o
1)t21) (27)





















1) = 0 (b)
(28)









1 ¡ s1 + t21]: (29)







We can use a similar procedure for country two’s problem, where the budget
constraint is given by (2) for i = 2. The …rst–order condition with respect to s2
determines ¸
e
2 and the budget constraint yields (12).
B. Appendix B: Proof of (17)
Through (16) for migration equilibrium, Ne
1 becomes an implicit function of the
instruments including the emigration subsidy. Totally di¤erentiating this equation
and using dNe
1 = ¡dNe






















Since the problem for country one remains that of appendix A, (27), (28) and (29)
hold thereby leading to (11). However, because s21 is introduced, the problem for
country two changes to
max
fs2;s21g
L2 = y2+ s2 + ¸2(R2 ¡ N2s2 ¡ (No
2 ¡ N2)s21): (31)Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 23
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2 ¡ s2+ s21] (33)







C. Appendix C: Proof of (23)
The problems and …rst–order conditions for both countries remain unchanged, that
is, (27)–(29) and (31)–(33) hold. What changes is how the countries perceive the






























1 and t21 = s1:












1) > 0 and s21 = s2, thereby verifying (23).
D. Appendix D: Extension to Heterogeneous Populations








2 for i = a;b:
Through migration equilibrium conditions, Ni
1 becomes an implicit function of the
instruments. Totally di¤erentiating these equations and using dNi
1 = ¡dNi
2 allows us













































2 and where A = yaaybb ¡ (yab)2 > 0 for
stability:Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 24




























































1 ) = 0 for i = a;b (b)
(37)

















































If we introduce this equality in (37) to solve for ¸1, we get ¸1 = 1: Simplifying (38)
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21 for i = a;b: (41)
Substituting this, (35), the de…nition of A; and (25(a)) into (37) proves that f(25(a))
and ¸1 = 1g solves the system.
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2) = 0 for i = a;b (b)
(43)

















































If we introduce this equality in (43) to solve for ¸2, we get ¸2 = 1: Simplifying (44)
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21 for i = a;b: (47)
Substituting this, (35), the de…nition of A; and (25(b)) into (43) proves that f(25(b))
and ¸2 = 1g solves the system.
It should be clear how to extend to any …nite number of labour types. This
would also work with a national objective function based on the utilities of the in-
digenous population. What is being maximised above is total consumption (income)
for the indigenous population, which is a necessary condition for maximising a na-
tional objective function based on the utilities of the indigenous population given the
instrument set.33
D.2. Private Land Ownership.
33In order to maximise national income, there are more instruments than you actually need in
the above problem: setting sa
1 = 0 would still allow you to prove that ¸1 = 1: But once you
start maximising a function of utilities, you would typically need all instruments to implement the
distributional aim implied by the objective function.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 26
An Immobile Land–Owning Class. Assume there is landinthemodel owned
by Nc
i ´ Nco
i for i = 1;2immobile landowners, eachowningone unit of land, andthat
land is paid its marginal product yc
i by …rms. The governments subsidise (tax) them
at the rate sc







































The …rst order conditions are given by (37),
N
co
1 (1 ¡ ¸1) = 0 (49)
and the budget constraint. Equation (38) is unchanged, but note that j in the
summation is indexed over j = a;b;c: The simpli…cations and cancellation procedure





1 and thus the solution is as before: The underlying logic is
that any change in yc
1 is captured by the landowners. Given this, and the trivial
way landownership changes the problem, it is clear that adding land and immobile
landowners to country two’s problem leads to (25(b)). The fact that (25) remains
unchanged does not mean that the equilibrium values for variables do not change.
For example, you might imagine that if more immigrants increase yc
1, and that then
this was shared with workers through an increase in si
1, that ti
21 would also increase
in equilibrium and the reverse would happen in country two.
Workers Own the Land. Assume that each worker of type a owns one unit of




as before the return to land—but now going to type a: The migration equilibrium
conditions remain unchanged because yc
2 cancels out from both sides and, with ta
21
and sa
21, the governments already have the all instruments they need to discriminate






















The …rst order conditions are given by (37) and the budget constraint.
34The one di¤erence here is that the population being determined directly by the migration
equilibrium condition for type a labour is the number of type a originating in country 2 who migrate
to 1.Tow ards a Better System for Immigration Control 27
Equation (38) is unchanged, other than adding Nao
1 yic
1 to the summation. The
simpli…cations and cancellation procedure is identical, except that the simpli…cation







1 for i = a;b, and thus Nao
1 yic
1 cancels out
because immigrants do not receive land rents in country one. Consequently (25(a))
obtains once again: The result for country two uses exactly the same approach as
above, except you add Nao
2 yic
2 to the summation in (44) which then cancels out with







2 because type a emigrants still receive land
rents originating in country 2. Consequently (25(b)) obtains again.
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